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Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) is an emerging and developing philosophy which, established 
by Winnick and Wexler, and continued by the work of Perlin (inter alia), has been 
predominately used to explain the operation and efficacy of drug courts and the criminal 
justice system generally. It recognises that law has the potential to have both therapeutic and 
anti-therapeutic effects, and thus it is in the use of its rules, whilst not transgressing 
normative values, that therapeutic outcomes should be realised. More recently, however, TJ 
has been used to explore other legal jurisdictions beyond its drug and mental health origins – 
even to musical TJ.
1
 In respect of the law surrounding motor vehicle insurance and the 
compensation applicable to third-party victims, a TJ approach has been used to discuss the 
standard of care in torts law (in an American context
2
 and that of the law in India)
3
 
recognising the common agenda present in both the deterrence of potential injurers and the 
restoration of the injured. In the UK, motor vehicle insurance is governed through statutory 
(for example the Road Traffic Act 1988) and extra-statutory measures (for example the 
Untraced Drivers’ Agreement 2017), underpinned by the United Kingdom (UK)’s obligations 
to the European Union (EU). The extra-statutory element of this regulatory scheme is the 
focus of this paper. It is unique in the exploration of the procedural rules relating, primarily, 
to the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement concluded between the Motor Insurers’ Bureau and the 
Secretary of State for Transport. This Agreement has been defective in correctly transposing 
EU law into national law and, we argue, the UK’s fulfilment of its withdrawal from the EU 
could prove the opportunity for a new Agreement, based on conscious contracting, to remove 
the anti-therapeutic features present and to expunge the worst elements of an agreement that 
often fails to ensure the restoration of vulnerable third-party victims.    
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The EU was formed on the basis of four key principles known as the four freedoms - the free 
movement of goods, services, capital and labour. Not only were they enshrined in the treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957’s Treaty of Rome, they were 
reinvigorated to ensure their completion through the Single European Act 1986, the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. These freedoms were created to facilitate 
free trade throughout the EU as a trading block (the EEC) and formed the basis for the 
development to the EU (incorporating various social policy rights). Underlying provisions of 
these freedoms were the free movement of persons and of goods which, in respect of motor 
vehicle insurance, were the catalyst for the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives (MVID), a 
suite of Directives
4
 which required Member States of the EU to transpose their provisions 
into national law. The UK attempted to achieve this through various statutory measures, 
including the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA88), but also through agreements concluded 
between the UK (via the Secretary of State for Transport) and the Motor Insurers’ Bureau 
(MIB - a private body owned by a conglomerate of the motor insurance industry). Two 
agreements were used to achieve this requirement – the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement 
(UDA - where the MIB would act as the insurer of last resort for the negative consequences 
affecting third-party victims of uninsured drivers), and the Untraced Drivers Agreement ( 
UtDA - where, in a similar vein, the MIB would settle the claims of third-party victims of 
 2 
untraced drivers / vehicles).
5
 This paper focuses on the latest (2017) UtDA, but to place in 
context the discussion presented, we refer to the previous UtDA (2003) and both the latest 
and previous UDAs (2015 and 1999) to highlight the continuation of many of the most anti-
therapeutic elements of the Agreements and the lack of positive engagement on the part of 
the Government and MIB to remedy the defects in the latest iterations. 
 
There have been several Agreements concluded between the Secretary of State and the MIB 
to give effect, in part at least, to developments at EU law. This has been due to the enactment 
of new Directives, the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
which have necessitated changes to the UDA and/or UtDA, or indeed it has been through 
some critical reflection on the part of the parties, perhaps also due to some criticism levelled 
at those Agreements through academic commentary.
6
 However, the result is that there have 
been significant disparities between the requirements imposed on Member States and the UK 
giving effect to these. The consequence is that in many situations the third-party victims of 
negligent uninsured or untraced drivers have been in a worse position nationally than they 




Motor insurance law has in recent years received greater attention from academics. This is 
largely due to some high-profile cases
8
 where the interaction between national and EU law, 
and the disparity between the two, has been highlighted. However, this particular area of the 
law (the consistency between the two sources of law in respect of third-party victims’ rights 
and the newest UtDA concluded in 2017 between the Secretary of State and the MIB) has yet 
to attract academics’ attention. Perhaps this was due to the looming presence of Brexit and 
the conclusion, at least prior to the COVID-19 outbreak and its global effect on the 
development of politics and treaty agreement and dissolution,
9
 of the debate as whether the 
UK would actually ever truly leave the EU. This being settled following the election of the 
Conservative government in December 2019, it became a moot point whether the UK 
breached its EU obligations in the realm of motor vehicle insurance law as the Prime Minister 
had categorically confirmed that the UK would no longer remain part of the Single Market or 
the EU Customs Union (and hence the existing requirement the UK to maintain all laws 
which facilitate the free movement principles upon which the MVID were based). Given that 
enforcement of the MVID domestically had been haphazard at best, this development to the 
UK’s conclusive withdrawal from the EU had not assisted in the academic scrutiny of the 
MVID and the UK’s statutory and extra-statutory implementing/transposing measures. Some 
authors, such as Channon,
10
 have proffered what a future MIB series agreement may look 
like, removed from the shackles of having to conclude their agreements with the Secretary of 
State whilst simultaneously adhering to the requirements of the MVID. What we intend to do 
in this paper is to present some of the more problematic aspects of the substantive and 
procedural defects and deficiencies within the UtDA, and then to consider how these might 
be ameliorated by a movement to a TJ philosophy, adopting a conscious contracts approach, 
which could remove the most anti-therapeutic aspects of the existing and future UtDA. 
 
2. A MOVEMENT TOWARDS CONSCIOUS CONTRACTS? 
 
The MIB is a not-for-profit limited company which was established in 1946 and represents 
the interests of all the regulated motor vehicle insurance bodies in the UK. Every insurer who 
issues policies in the UK must be a member of the MIB and a proportion of every premium 
paid by customers is taken by the MIB to fund its work and facilitates the payments it makes 
to the qualifying third-party victims of accidents caused by uninsured or untraced drivers. 
The two sources, nationally, which facilitate the protection for such victims are the UDA 
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2015 (as amended) and the UtDA 2017. Both of these are concluded between the MIB and 
the Secretary of State for Transport, and they incorporate (transpose) provisions as required 
in the MVID. Therefore, the two main parties are the MIB and Secretary of State, and they 
contract (even though the title is an ‘agreement’) on the basis of compliance as a minimum 
with EU law for the benefit of third-party victims who would, in other circumstances, have a 
claim in damages against the negligent driver at fault (and thereby through the driver’s 
insurers). 
 
It should be noted from the outset that the MVID was inspired by the first agreement between 
the MIB and the Minister of War Transport (now Secretary of State for Transport). The UK, 
therefore, having enacted the Road Traffic Act 1930 (RTA30), observed the potential 
deficiencies in the application of the RTA30. The Act did not protect third-party victims of 
drivers who lacked insurance or the means to satisfy judgments following their negligent 
driving. This aided the creation of the MIB and thereafter the first UDA and latterly the 
UtDA. Thus, the UK began its contracting on the basis of protecting a group in society for 
which no legal obligation previously existed. However, the EU, having been inspired by the 
agreement and the RTA30 when drafting the first MVID in 1972, continued through a further 
five iterations of the MVID with the UK, since its accession in 1973, trailing behind the 
expansive range of protection being developed by the EU. These conflicts between the UK’s 
Agreements and the requirements in the MVID (as presented in this paper) will demonstrate 
how the MIB and Secretary of State have been contracting in breach of the MVID for many 
years. This continues despite academic commentary, clear instruction in the source MVID 
and the jurisprudence of the CJEU. This leads to the conclusion that an active choice is being 
made when contracting between the MIB and Secretary of State to avoid some compulsory 
aspects of the MVID, and this adversely affects third-party protections. Perhaps the most 
recent agreements neglected to fulfil completely the provisions in the MVID because of the 
anti-EU sentiment of the dominant Conservative political party (in its coalition Government 
with the Liberal Democrat party) in respect of various social-policy measures; possibly this 
was exacerbated by the Brexit-vote of 2016 with a political mindset that the UK was 
withdrawing its membership of the EU and therefore had no strong compulsion to follow EU 
rules and the jurisprudence of the CJEU which were to be removed and ended (respectively) 
following enactment of the various iterations of the Withdrawal Bill (which was finalised and 
became the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020). Certainly from a doctrinal 
perspective, there was no real justification for the UK’s general misapplication and non-
transposition of elements of the MVID in national law (despite judicial assertions to the 
contrary in the Roadpeace v Secretary of State for Transport
 11
 Judicial Review proceedings) 
and indeed even the Supreme Court as recently as 2019
12
 was demonstrating a fundamental 
misunderstanding of national obligations in respect of the MVID. An argument might be 
established for the justification of the differences between national law and its EU parent by 
using critical legal theory as a more all-encompassing structure which could explain a 
judiciary failing to appreciate significant errors present in national legal and procedural 
measures. However, each of the above does not change the conclusion. UK law fails to 
adequately protect third-party victims due to technical failures and breaches present in the 
UDA and UtDA. 
 
Why then, given that the problems surrounding the agreements between the MIB and the 
Secretary of State concern compliance with EU law, would there need to be consideration of 
the issue which will by necessity be resolved at the conclusion of the transitional period (at 
the end of the 2020 at the time of writing, the implications of COVID-19 notwithstanding)? 
Our suggestion is based on two possible scenarios that will impact the UK and the MIB in the 
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near future. First, the withdrawal from the EU might be seen as an opportunity for the MIB to 
contract with the Secretary of State in a much more positive and humanistic way. It could see 
its place as leading the way, as it did in 1946, of protecting vulnerable groups through 
innovative and thorough schemes of compensation which would reposition the MIB as a 
genuine compensatory body (as envisioned by the MVID)
13
 and would also confirm the 
Conservative government’s assertions about the benefits for the UK from leaving the EU and 
being able to establish its laws without the restrictions imposed by that body. Secondly, and 
perhaps more plausibly, is that the MIB should seize this opportunity to demonstrate its 
valuable existence ahead of the widespread adoption of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles 
(CAV). It is anticipated that CAVs, at level 3 and above, will be on UK roads by 2035. As 
these move towards level 5
14
 (i.e. being fully autonomous and requiring no human 
intervention at all in the driving process) the traditional model of insurance is likely to be 
replaced through a system of product liability. Therefore, the MIB, as insurer of last resort, 
might find itself in a position of redundancy. In an attempt to reverse this (perhaps) inevitable 
consequence, the MIB could contract with the Secretary of State to provide a competitive 
advantage to road users, pedestrians and even, through the equivalent of the current Green 
Card Scheme, to foreign visitors who find themselves victims of untraced negligent drivers. 
Such positive positioning might convince the public, legislators and policymakers that the 
maintenance of a compulsory insurance scheme might be advantageous to all and ensure the 
continuation of the MIB as a national compensatory body. 
 
This is where a TJ approach might serve as a particularly effective philosophy to guide future 
agreements beyond 2020. We were inspired to investigate the suitability of this aspect of TJ 
through the work of J. Kim Wright
15
 and her development of conscious contracts.
16
 Here, 
using plain English, a relational process allows the parties to determine the underlying 
purpose of the contract (to form a system of protection for the third-party victims of 
uninsured and/or untraced drivers), what the parties want to achieve and to obtain from the 
agreement (a system which enables protection of rights and values, respecting all parties), 
and to incorporate their values into a document which seeks to avoid adversarialism and 
rather pursue alternatives, such as mediation, to the traditional court system as a forum for 
dispute resolution. The need for developments in this respect are perhaps difficult to see in 
the abstract. Therefore, the next section of the paper presents examples of where the UtDA 
creates problems for vulnerable third-party victims from exercising rights supposedly 
guaranteed at law. It is readily evident how certain groups in society might be particularly 
vulnerable when either defending themselves in court cases or having to assert their rights. 
Minors,
17
 persons with a mental illness,
18




 and so on are 
just a few of the groups who may find themselves disadvantaged when entering the civil 
justice system. The vulnerable groups we are discussing in this paper, who might also find 
themselves in the aforementioned categories, are the third-party victims of road traffic 
accidents. Not only do they frequently suffer physical and economic losses associated with 
their post-accident injuries, but they find themselves being unable to secure the compensation 
from the tortfeasor had the driver been insured and/or traced. These are people who 
frequently experience life-changing injuries due to their road traffic accident
21
 and may face 
difficulties in recovering compensation from the very body established and designed to offer 
this protection. Taken on this basis, it is possible to view the current UDtA as being anti-
therapeutic on a number of bases. 
 
3. THE UNTRACED DRIVERS’ AGREEMENT 2017 
 
 5 
The UtDA 2017 is the most recent addition to the suite of agreements concluded between the 
MIB and the Secretary of State. It came into force on 1 March 2017 and affects any claim on 
or after this date where the victim has suffered injuries and loss following the actions of an 
untraced driver / vehicle. The 2017 agreement was preceded by the 2003 agreement which 
applies to accidents occurring between 2 February 2003 and 28 February 2017. Under the 
UtDA 2017 and 2003, the MIB is designated as the compensatory body and insurer of last 
resort as it is for cases invoking the other MIB Agreements. In respect of the previous 
Agreements, the MIB and the Secretary of State have frequently been criticised for the failure 
to draft a coherent and compliant document. Indeed, both Agreements (the UtDA and the 
UDA) fail to take into account the requirements of the MVIDs and to properly consult 
interested parties to ensure that the Agreements achieve their target of protecting innocent 




In this respect, and due to the 2003 Agreement’s failure to meet the MVIDs’ requirements, 
there was a small but vocal demand for changes to the 2003 Agreement.
23
 The need for 
changes to rid the pitfalls of the 2003 Agreement led to the amended 2017 version. This new 
Agreement was signed, as with the other Agreements, aiming to remove any elements of 
uncertainty that may arise as a consequence of contradicting EU law (the MVID) and the 
Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). It does, however, remain that the law in this respect has 
struggled to achieve the minimum thresholds of protections as required under the MVIDs. 
Indeed, we would argue that it is fair to conclude that the exclusion clauses and procedural 
rules established under this Agreement, when thoroughly examined, cannot be deemed to 
provide any semblance of legal certainty. The 2017 Agreement is of the same quality in 
respect of compatibility with the MVID as was the Agreement in 2003. The UtDA 2017 is 
complicated and imposes unacceptable exclusions and unfair procedural rules that if not met, 
denies victims’ access to their rights. However, following the judicial review in RoadPeace,24 
some of the worst unlawful exclusions, such as terrorism exclusions, property damage 
exclusions and some appeal processes related to arbitration, were removed. Regardless, the 
majority of the other breaches present in the 2003 Agreement were left unchanged.  
 
3.1 THE SCOPE OF THE 2017 AGREEMENT   
 
The UtDA operates to plug the gap that exists in the national scheme of compulsory motor 
vehicle insurance. Whilst it is a requirement that owners of vehicles used on roads are 
covered by a policy of insurance, third-party victims, in the event that the negligent driver 
who caused the accident does not have insurance, or where the driver is not identified 
following the accident, enables the third-party to recover damages against the MIB as if they 
were suing the identified and insured driver at fault. Hence, the MIB’s liability, under this 
Agreement, is that a claimant would have secured an award had his claim been made against 
an identified driver (the driver was traceable). An important exemption to be noted, from the 
outset, is that the UtDA does not apply to an accident where the driver was identified but 
cannot be traced. 
 
Under cl 3(1) there are certain conditions imposed on an applicant to be met in order for the 
claim to proceed, the first of which being that the application must first fall within the scope 
of the Agreement. The Agreement applies only to cases where a) there is death, bodily injury 
or property damage; b) that takes place on a road or other public place; c) that arises out of 
the use of a vehicle insured according to the RTA88 requirements;
25
 and d) where the 
accused driver is unidentified. The MIB reserves the right to reject any application without 
even investigation if a claim does not meet these criteria – on the basis that such claims do 
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not fall within its scope. Further, the MIB has the right to reject any claim falling within its 
scope if it believes that the claim does not qualify to be considered (and therefore processed 
and awarded). This is in addition to the other exclusions present under cll 4-10. The issue 
here is that the Agreement not only unlawfully excludes claims from its scope (such as those 
to do with geographical restrictions) but also gives permission to the MIB to, where possible, 
apply exclusions to the ones that fall within its scope which may lead to exclusions based on 
its interest regardless of the victims’ circumstances. For example, the Agreement repeats the 
same mistakes that exist under the other Agreements when referring to the definitions of 
‘road,’ ‘other public place’ and ‘motor vehicle’ as also apply in the RTA88.26 These 
references reflect the reluctance of the MIB to ensure compliance with the MVID as such 
restrictions do not exist and are not allowed under the MVID. In other words, the claims of 
victims of hit and run accidents, cannot be actioned against the MIB unless the vehicle was 
intended for use on the road and the accident happened on a road or other public place. This 
leaves accidents happening on private land, where the public has no access, beyond the range 
of cover and with no route to compensation under this Agreement. The broad interpretation 
of Vnuk
27
 leaves this Agreement, in this respect at least, in breach of the MVID. The ruling in 
Vnuk
28
 is clear that third-party victims must be compensated to the minimum required level 
by the MVID in any circumstances where an accident involving a vehicle and the use of it is 
consistent with the normal function of that vehicle. Furthermore, the requirement for 
insurance according to the MVID relies on the use of the vehicle, not where the vehicle is 
used. Therefore, the current national law scope of cover should be extended. The 
Government and its representative (the MIB) can no longer deny this state of affairs, 




3.2. DISPUTE RESOLUTION THROUGH FORCED ARBITRATION 
 
The process of an applicant claiming damages through the MIB where the driver at fault 
cannot be identified involves the submission of evidence, the consideration of this to the 
MIB’s satisfaction, and then the issuing of an award to the applicant. Where the applicant is 
not satisfied with this award, they may dispute it through a system of arbitration. The 
agreement between the MIB and Secretary of State compels the use of arbitration to resolve 
these disputes. The nature of the claims under the UtDA, and the imposition of compulsory 
arbitration, creates potential problems for the parties which the Agreement does not seem to 
ameliorate. To begin, claims are made by the third-party victim to the MIB on the basis of 
forms and within time-frames established by it.
30
 The MIB is then tasked with assessing this 




 due to the lack of 
perceived independence of the MIB
33
 in that it determines the issues, runs the investigation 
into the claim and makes the award of damages to the claimant.
34
 Where the claimant is not 
satisfied with the decision of the MIB or the arbitration process, they may seek recourse to 
the courts. First, the claimant has only six weeks from the date of the MIB’s decision to 
appeal the decision
35
 and the arbitrator used in the case is selected from a panel of Queen’s 
Counsel as chosen by the Secretary of State.
36
 As identified above, it is possible to argue 
against the impartiality of this system and the nature of a scheme whereby the investigator to 
the claim also is the body which chooses the decision and establishes any quantum of 
damages. However, the main contention as to the anti-therapeutic element of arbitration in its 
current form is the difficulty the applicant has to have the decision of the arbitrator appealed 
to the courts. The Arbitration Act 1996, at s 69(3), provides 
 
leave to appeal shall be given only if the court is satisfied—(a)that the determination 
of the question will substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties, (b)that 
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the question is one which the tribunal was asked to determine, (c)that, on the basis of 
the findings of fact in the award— (i)the decision of the tribunal on the question is 
obviously wrong, or (ii)the question is one of general public importance and the 
decision of the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt, and (d)that, despite the 
agreement of the parties to resolve the matter by arbitration, it is just and proper in 
all the circumstances for the court to determine the question. 
 
Thus, the prospect of the applicant being able to demonstrate that a decision of fact is 
‘obviously wrong’ is a particularly high test to meet. Indeed, the nature of claims under the 
UtDA means that it is a paper-based exercise, based almost exclusively on the facts of the 
matter rather than the application of legal principle. The negligent driver is not present to be 
questioned nor is there a mechanism through which evidence may be deduced from the 
tortfeasor. The MIB in such circumstances may largely conclude matters in isolation knowing 
that the only practical recourse the applicant has is to a system of dispute resolution which is 
based on rules it has established in a contract with the Secretary of State. The decisions of the 
arbitration process are unpublished which makes external scrutiny difficult, as is also the case 
in respect of a consistency of decision making and precedent formation.
37
 For example, in 
Harvey v MIB,
38
 the applicant appealed the MIB’s decision to reduce the compensation 
awarded under contributory negligence,
39
 only to have the entire award rescinded by the 
arbitrator who concluded there was no evidence of negligence demonstrated. The attempted 
recourse to appeal to the courts was rejected on the basis that the decision was factual and 
had no basis as a point of law, nor was it a matter of sufficient public interest to warrant a 
court hearing. Consequently, most claims are settled at an early stage and do not proceed to 
court. 
 
3.3. THE RIGHT TO APPEAL 
 
A claimant may under cl 15 have the right to appeal against a decision of the MIB. For 
instance, where a claimant believes that his claim does fall within the scope of the Agreement 
and the MIB disagree, or where the compensation awarded by the MIB does not include 
interest and legal costs and so on, an appeal process should exist to an independent body. 
Unlike the 2003 UtDA, under the 2017 Agreement, the MIB must take into account interest 
and legal costs when issuing an award, which is a positive step in reducing the negative 
effects on third-party victims seeking redress under the UtDA. It is nevertheless, limited. The 
right of appeal, under this Agreement, must be made to an arbitrator within the six weeks of 
the MIB’s notification of its decision. Failing to comply with this criterion may result in his 
right of appeal being rejected. Furthermore, the appeal is based on written submissions which 
means it may lack the effective consideration of other legal sources such as the MVID as well 
as the judgments of the CJEU. However, unlike the UDAs (1999 & 2015) or the previous 
UtDA 2003, either party (a claimant or the MIB) can request an oral hearing, and where it 
takes place, the MIB is charged, at its own cost, to arrange the hearing. Furthermore, a 




However, the oral hearings may have some negative consequences that prevent a claimant 
from seeking this route of remedy. Although generally the arbitrator’s fee is to be paid by the 
MIB, the arbitrator has the right to permit the MIB to recover such fees from the claimant or 
his representative if, for instance, the arbitrator believes that written submissions were 
sufficient to decide on this matter (with no grounds for appeal). It is perhaps understandable 
to have such orders against the claimant in cases of fraud, but how and based on what matters 
the arbitrator can decide that the oral hearing or the appeal was unnecessary is contentious 
 8 
and would not necessarily be readily obvious to a litigant in person who does not have access 
to legal advice. Further, the claimant has no automatic right to appeal against the arbitrator’s 
decisions. Such practices contradict the MVID’s aim to protect third-party victims as to 
require them to bear the cost of procedural matters when seeking justice. This may also 
breach the principle of equivalence and effectiveness as the case would be dealt with 
differently had the unidentified driver been identified and the claim brought against him (see 




Furthermore, the arbitrator is not allowed to rely on the MVID in his judgment or any other 
sources such as the jurisprudence of the CJEU, rather he is restricted to determine the matter 
on the submissions of the parties. The claimant’s lack of an automatic right to appeal to a 
court breaches the MVID to have access to a fair appeal. 
 
3.4. EXCEPTIONS WITHIN THE 2017 AGREEMENT  
 
There are certain clauses incorporated into this Agreement on which the MIB can rely to 
totally or partially avoid its responsibility to satisfy the claim of an applicant made under the 
UtDA 2017. The main anti-therapeutic clauses include: 
 
3.4.1. DEDUCTIONS  
 
The 2017 Agreement permits the MIB to deduct, from any award it grants, any other 
payments that the claimant is entitled to receive or has received.
42
 This is an unlawful 
practice (exclusions and deductions) that not only continues under this Agreement but also 
applied under the UDA 1999 and UtDA 2003, and continues too in the UDA 2015. The MIB 
is permitted to deduct an amount of money paid in relation to some road traffic accident 
claims. The question here is that if a person was unfortunate to get hit by an untraced motor 
vehicle, deductions from the payable compensation may be made by the MIB which would 
not be the case if the claim was handled by an insured and identified vehicle and driver. 
Therefore, how can a deduction be justified in such cases and claim at the same time that the 
victim was fairly compensated for his accident, where he in fact was compensated 
partially/fully by, for example claims made on the basis of his own health insurance policy? 
It is hard to understand the link between what the victim received in payment from his health 
insurance cover (for which he has been paying) and the justifiable deduction of this payment 
from any compensation which would have to be made by the MIB.  
 
In this respect, the MIB usually stipulates prior to any liability that a claimant who expects 
payment from other sources to assign to the MIB the right to such payment.
43
 Although such 
deductions are permitted under the MVID too, the MIB Agreement breaches the victim’s 
right to have fair compensation for that particular accident. The issue of blame here is not to 
be levelled at the MIB alone, but the EU too. Article 10 of the MVID
44
 requires victims of 
road traffic accidents to be compensated ‘at least up to the limits of the insurance obligation,’ 
which means that victims must not be paid less than a similar claim made against an insured 
driver within the Member State. Nevertheless, the MVID does not specify the source of 
compensation but seeks to ensure equivalence. For instance, in Evans v Secretary of State for 
the Environment,
45
 the claimant was unable to recover his entitlement from the MIB. The 
claimant then pursued his claim through a different route, arguing state liability
46
 against the 
UK. He claimed that the UtDA 2003 did not comply with the MVID. His challenge was 
based on a) the legal status of the MIB; b) the lack of provision for the award of costs and 
interest; and c) that arbitration under the 2003 Agreement failed to comply with the European 
 9 
Convention on Human Rights (to have a fair and open hearing). The CJEU held that where 
there is an obligation for compensation, it is essential to consider interest alongside. The 
Court also accepted that the procedural rules of the arbitration system were not fair and 
contradict EU requirements. However, the Court dismissed the case based on the MIB’s 
voluntary nature (it enters into a contract-like relationship with the State) and the case was 
referred back to the English High Court to decide if the conditions required under Joined 
Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci and others v Italy
47
 were met in this case. 
This situation continues under the UtDA 2017. However, since the 2017 Agreement, and as 
noted above, interest payments have been added. 
 
To conclude, even if a claimant was fully compensated by the MIB, the claimant would still 
receive a lesser payment than had his claim been made directly against the driver’s insurer. 
This point was even acknowledged in Cameron v Hussain
48
 where it was stated that ‘the 
claimant might well regard a claim under the UtDA as an inferior remedy to a court action 
for damages and under Section 151 [of the RTA88]’49 (authors’ emphasis). Furthermore, 
protecting third-party victims of road traffic accidents is a legal requirement. For example, if 
a person used or permitted others to use his vehicle on a road or other public place with no 
legal cover obtained according to Part VI of the RTA88,
50
 he, in such an instance, commits a 
criminal offence
51
 (see Monk v Warbey).
52
 The aim of such legislation is to ensure that third-
party victims will not be left uncompensated and thus when the MIB is permitted to fail to 
meet its obligations in this respect, it undermines not only the MVID but also the RTA88.  
 
3.4.2. JOINT (BUT SEEMINGLY NOT SEVERAL) LIABILITY  
 
The MIB, under cl 23 of the Agreement, may refuse to meet its liability in full where death, 
injury or damage to property was caused by more than one person and one or more of them 
was identified. The MIB may proceed on the basis that as the drivers shared responsibility for 
the death or personal injury, they too shall share liability. The MIB in such cases reduces its 
liability to the ones who were unidentified and leaves the remaining responsibility to be met 
by the ones identified. Although such deductions might be permitted under the MVID as the 
MIB could argue that it is an insurer of last resort and only liable for untraced and uninsured 
drivers, it is, however, not clear under this Agreement how such claims would be settled in 
favour of the victims (to provide them the right compensation). Furthermore, the MIB’s 
liability in such cases would be based on what proportion of loss that can be attributed to the 
unidentified person/s concerned, which may undermine the right of the victim to fair 
compensation according to the MVID as its (the MIB) award would be based on probabilities 
(disproportionately). Finally, what if the other liable person/s cannot meet their liability 
toward the victim? Victims’ rights in such incidents would be definitely undermined under 
this Agreement which opposes the protective purpose of the MVID.   
 
3.4.3. DEROGATED VEHICLES  
 
Article 3 of the Sixth MVID is perhaps the most important part in regard to the obligation 
imposed on Member States to ensure third-party victims of road traffic accidents are 
protected. Under this Article, Member States must ensure that civil liability, in regard of the 
use of a vehicle on their territory, is covered by a minimum of third-party cover to ensure 
victims suffering loss or injury in the use of vehicles have their fair compensation met. The 
MVID however, permits some exclusions under Article 5 under what is called ‘derogation.’ 
Here a Member State may derogate from the requirements for a vehicle to be subject to 
compulsory insurance (for example police vehicles and the NHS’s vehicles in the UK). 
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Nonetheless, the derogation does not mean that this kind of vehicle does not need to be 
covered by insurance against third-party civil liability, rather it left it to local authorities or 
the Crown to satisfy claims based on its needs. In other words, claims arising out of the use 
of derogated vehicles will be met by the authority and not necessarily an insurer. Article 3 
provides that insurers are liable and shall compensate third-party victims of road traffic 
accidents for any personal injuries arising out of the use of a vehicle, regardless of the degree 
of relation between passengers and the policyholder. However, this does not cover the owner 
of the vehicle when they are a passenger in their own vehicle.  
 
The UtDA does not differentiate between accidents occurring by such vehicles while owned 
and possessed by the Authority/Crown and where, for instance, they have been unlawfully 
used by an unidentified person. Victims of accidents where these vehicles have been 
unlawfully taken are likely to be left without compensation as the MIB is able to deny 
responsibility in these circumstances.  
 
3.4.4. DAMAGE TO PROPERTY  
 
The 2017 Agreement stipulates that an award for property damage is conditional on a 
claimant suffering personal injury from the same accident. The injury must however be 
‘significant’ and an award has been satisfied by the MIB in order for it to process the claim 
for property damage. Furthermore, the MIB does not process property damage claims unless 
the claims exceed £400. Such requirements might be considered to reflect less than good faith 
but the MIB would likely argue for the need to take these measures to prevent fraud as, in its 
absence, the result may be an uncontrollable number of claims being submitted. This, 
nevertheless, should not operate at the expense of innocent victims of untraced drivers but 
should be balanced (as ultimately it is the duty of the MIB to have the right measures to 
control for such issues, not the victims). Therefore, the MIB should not be in a position to 
exploit such incidents to undermine third-party victims’ rights of untraced drivers and 
thereby the MVID.  
 
3.4.5. PASSENGER CLAIMS AND BURDEN OF PROOF 
 
Under cl 8(1) of the UtDA 2017, the MIB has the right to deny any liability in respect of 
death, bodily injury or property damage arising out of the use of a vehicle where a claimant 
voluntarily let himself be a passenger in a vehicle he ‘knew or ought to have known’; a) was 
stolen or unlawfully taken, or b) uninsured according to the national requirement.
53
 However, 
the use in the course or furtherance of a crime or to escape from lawful apprehension, which 
is applicable to any case falling into the scope of the 2003 Agreement, is removed from this 
Agreement. To some extent, there is no objection to the exclusion permitted under this 
Agreement as it is permitted by the MVID. However, the issue is that the 2017 Agreement 
applies constructive knowledge rather than actual knowledge – in a similar way to that 
provision in the UDAs 1999 and 2015. A passenger who voluntarily let himself in the vehicle 
which caused the personal injury or property damage, is excluded under the UtDA 2003
 
 if he 
unreasonably failed to leave the vehicle when possible. Further issues include use of the term 
‘unlawfully taken,’ which widens the number of claims that fall beyond the scope of the 
MIB’s liability as well as the restriction applied to only those vehicles insured under the 
RTA88 which excludes even more vehicles (and thereby claims available for victims). 
Furthermore, the limitation to the MIB’s liability relating to a ‘vehicle used without a 
contract of insurance in relation to its use’ may imply a knowledge in certain situations but it 
would be questionable how someone knew or ought to have known that the vehicle being 
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used was being so used in relation of its use according to the policy. However, that 
contradicts the clear statement of Article 10 of the MVID
54
 as to permit exclusions only in 
the case of an ‘uninsured’ vehicle where the passenger ‘knew’ (and this can be proved) of this 
status. The Agreement widens this to include ‘in relation to’ its use. 
 
Back to the removal of the exclusion clause ‘in furtherance of a crime’ the MIB successfully, 
in McCracken v Smith and Ors
55
 for instance, argued that they were not liable for any 
damage suffered by the victim due to his criminal conduct (the victim was a passenger of a 
stolen vehicle). Despite the removal of the exclusion clause in UtDA 2017, it remains valid 
for the purposes of UtDA 2003 and can be used against the interests of third-party victims for 
incidents occurring prior to 2015 (see for instance, Smith v Stratton & Anor),
56
 which reflects 
the unwillingness of the courts to take EU law into account when interpreting national law.  
 
Under cl 8(3) of the 2017 Agreement, the burden of proof is to be satisfied by the MIB that 
the claimant had the knowledge required under this Agreement in order to permit the 
exclusion.
 
 However, that was the case under the UtDA 2003 too. In this respect, the MIB 
may prove that the claimant knew or had reason to believe that the vehicle concerned is 
uninsured, stolen or unlawfully taken by proving that 1) the claimant is the owner or the 
registered keeper of the vehicle concerned (or permitted its use), 2) the vehicle is being used 
by a person who is below the minimum age to have a licence and therefore is unable to be 
covered by a policy and 3) that he is disqualified from driving. If the MIB can prove that the 
claimant knew or had reasons to believe in any of such matters then it would be deemed to 
have discharged its duty in respect of knowledge. The knowledge requirements under this 
Agreement seem to be sufficiently wide to make it easy for the MIB to shift the burden of 
proof to the victim, which can be deemed to breach the clear and simple requirement applied 




Therefore, the term ‘knew or had reason to believe’ is vague and can be misused by the MIB 
to claim that knowledge is proved by, for instance, proving negligence whereas the MVID’s 
term used is ‘knew,’ which requires actual knowledge. Such conflict between the two terms is 
very clear that the Agreement term is unlawful and needs to be restrictively interpreted to be 
compliant with the MVID, if not to be removed and replaced entirely by that used in the 
Directive.    
 
3.4.6. OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON APPLICANTS 
 
Under this Agreement, the MIB necessitates a claimant comply with its requirements and 
submit a claim using its specific form. This system may be viewed as being constructed with 
the primary aim of deterring as many claims as possible. For example, at cl 24, the MIB 
requires all documents and claims to be issued to it via fax or recorded delivery.
58
 Whilst it 
reserves the right for such delivery to be communicated in another way, this is at the 
discretion of the MIB and/or the applicant has to prove, conclusively, that the MIB had 
received the documents sent. This, it should be remembered, was included in an Agreement 
established in 2017 and, with the range of electronic communications systems available to 
individuals, businesses, legal professionals and professional bodies, to insist on the use of 
such dated mechanisms of communication seems not only surprising but deceptively complex 
and unnecessary.
59
 Furthermore, the claimant shall send the forms and documents within a 
reasonable time once required by the MIB. Failing to comply with this requirement means 
that the MIB can reject the claim. However, although the previous obligation, that of 
reporting to the police the accident involving the unidentified driver, has been removed under 
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this Agreement, it was applicable under the 2003 Agreement and it is still to be met if the 
MIB requires the claimant to do so for claims still applicable under that Agreement. Under cl 
10(5), the MIB requires a claimant to support his claim with satisfactory evidence and 
notification of costs, if applicable. Where a claim includes compensation for property 
damage, the claimant shall make the property available for inspection if required by the MIB. 
If the claimant fails to prove that there is such loss caused by a vehicle, supported by 
evidence of the cost to repair the damage caused by the vehicle concerned, he would be 
considered to have failed to comply with the Agreement’s requirements, which would result 
in the rejection of his claim. The clause is, however, merely a copy-paste of the previous 
Agreement, which reflects nothing but the MIB’s bad-faith in failing to develop this area of 
law.    
 
The 2017 Agreement, under cl 23, imposes obligations on the claimant that he must take all 
necessary steps in order to secure a judgment against an identified person/s who may be 
liable (partially to entirely) for death or property damage arising out of the use of a vehicle. 
The new clause imposes the same obligation required under the previous Agreement. 
Furthermore, a claimant, under cl 10(7), must acquire, where he succeeded, transcripts of the 
judgment and assign it to the MIB where required. However, by virtue of cl 11(6) a claimant 
cannot take an action against the driver at fault by himself without reference to the MIB. He 
is required to notify the MIB as soon as reasonably possible, as necessary in the Agreement.   
 
Finally, under cl 11 the MIB will only make an award in cases of death, bodily injury or 
damage to property arising out of the use of a vehicle if such an award would be issued had 
the person been identified. The award under this clause is based on the MIB’s assessment to 
whether or not the claim can be made. The issue that may face a claimant is that his claim 
would be decided based on probability and entirely at the discretion of the MIB, which may 
undermine the victims’ right to obtain fair compensation for his loss or bodily injury.  
 
3.4.7. PAYMENT AND VULNERABLE VICTIMS 
 
Under cl 13(1) of the UtDA 2017, and a remnant of the 2003 Agreement, the MIB is required 
to make payment within 14 days of the judgment once a claimant has accepted the MIB’s 
award. However, in the case of absence of any notice in respect of acceptance (no reply 
received by the MIB or a notice of appeal), the MIB shall wait until the time specified for the 
appeal to lapse, then it (the MIB) shall release the payment within the following 14 days. In 
doing so, the MIB would be considered to meet its obligations towards the claimant under 
this Agreement. However, unlike the UtDA 2003 where the MIB deals with claims involving 
an applicant who lacks mental capacity
60
 or is a minor
61
  without giving them the protection 
of legal advice, the 2017 Agreement does provide some sort of protection to such victims 
when it takes into account the victims’ ages or capacity to accept an offer made by the MIB. 
The 2017 Agreement offers protection to vulnerable victims through an arbitrator chosen by 
the Secretary of State to approve any award made to them by the MIB. Under this 
Agreement, the chosen arbitrator may request an oral hearing in order to approve an award 
made for incapable victims. However, the arbitrator has no power to decide on such disputes 
but only to approve what has been already decided by the MIB. If approval is refused by the 
appointed arbitrator then the MIB, under cl 14(12)(b), can request the appointment of a 
second arbitrator to submit to him its first proposal of the award (not to offer another one), 
which may make procedural approval questionable as to either be in favour of the MIB or to 
seek, under this clause, another arbitrator to approve what has been refused by the first. 
Furthermore, such a right to request another arbitrator to be appointed is not a luxury 
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afforded victims if, for instance, a victim was not satisfied with the MIB’s award. However, 
such victims are often, naturally, unable to assess whether or not their entitlement is fair.  
 
4. A THERAPEUTIC WAY FORWARDS? 
 
Given the knock-out (exclusion) clauses, unnecessary procedural impositions, and 
unreasonably restrictive interpretative and decision-making elements contained in the UtDA 
2017, in relation to both the MVID and the CPR, it can be seen how third-party victims 
would be in a poorer position when claiming through the UtDA than directly against the 
tortfeasor. This does not simply result in applicants receiving a slightly lessor sum in 
damages than they might have received in court (akin to a settlement agreement). Rather, 
victims whose injuries and damage may have significant negative effects on their financial 
position
62
 and their physical health, may be excluded from their rightful compensation or the 
system involved may be so fraughtful and detrimental to their mental health
63
 (and 
unnecessarily so) that it requires urgent action to remedy these defects. 
 
Changes to the Agreements between the MIB and Secretary of State, especially in respect of 
the UK’s withdrawal from the EU which will inevitably lead to substantial changes to those 
Agreements and the RTA88, have been considered recently. For instance, Channon
64
 has 
explored whether there may be merit in the Agreements being established on a statutory 
footing. This would enable a higher level of scrutiny and regulation of the agreement between 
the parties than currently applies, especially necessary following the UK’s withdrawal from 
the EU. We might suggest another, more therapeutically explicit method than this approach. 
Channon’s suggestions as proposed are eminently sensible, pragmatic and realistic. For us, 
however, given that the proposals are established in light of the UK’s withdrawal from the 
EU and the existing mechanisms to hold the MIB to account for the deficiencies in the 
transposition of the MVID will thereby be lost, imposing the necessity for a statutory 
measure capable of public scrutiny is unlikely to succeed. Agreements between the MIB and 
the Secretary of State in its various guises have been in place since the 1940s, and these have 
worked as intended between the parties with no concerns being raised by either side in terms 
of their content or their application. It seems unrealistic and unnecessary, at least from those 
parties’ perspective, for a new form of legal regulation to be established - along with the 
potential problems of enforcement via third-parties this would bring. It is also evident that 
from the case law and submissions by the MIB and the Secretary of State, the main problem 
they experienced with the Agreements were those raised in the context of the EU or by 
affected third-parties who wished to extend the Agreements to better reflect the requirements 
for third-party protection provided by the Directives or CPR. Once the MVID have no further 
application in the UK, and given the powers to be granted to Ministers through the European 
Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020,
65
 the regulation of compensation available to 
third-party victims of uninsured drivers and untraced vehicles will revert merely to the 
Agreement between the aforementioned parties and its compatibility with, at most, the CPR. 
Thus, it would seem odd that, whilst the intention of Channon is quite correct and would be 
beneficial to those victims, there would be little to be gained by the MIB or the Secretary of 
State who, as has been demonstrated in this paper, have had ample opportunity to remedy the 
deficiencies in the existing Agreements and steadfastly chose not to. This is a shame, yet it 
appears that with Brexit the protections fought so hard for through national courts in seminal 
















However, so as not to conclude a discussion on the future of motor vehicle insurance law on 
a depressingly negative note, there is a potential way forwards which not only maintains the 
status quo of the nature of the current structures used to conclude the Agreements between 
the parties but also provides a mechanism for ensuring a positive role for the MIB in securing 
rights for third-party victims. This approach, as advocated by Wright,
72
 adopts a therapeutic 
jurisprudence approach through conscious contracts. 
 
4.1. WHAT DOES CONSCIOUS CONTRACTING ENTAIL? 
 
Conscious contracts envisage a shifting of the mindset engrained in traditional contracting 
and commercial, arms-length relationships. The traditional system sees conflict resolution 
being a matter for lawyers, the courts and, certainly in the UK and US, an adversarial 
endeavour with a winner and loser. Contracts underpinning these relationships are complex, 
dense, designed to protect the interests of the parties, to enable them to defend their positions 
and to be interpreted, where needed, by the judiciary. Rather than being established on the 
basis of trust, they are established with rules to govern behaviour and for the contracting 
parties to have included various exclusion and limitation clauses to better their interests in the 
event of conflict. The mindset is one of protecting their own interests, often at the expense of 
the other side, and of getting away with the ‘best deal.’ 
 
Law students are, too, taught primarily to understand these principles and to work to 
replicating them in their professional career. Therefore, trying to get lawyers and parties to 
move to a new paradigm of contracting is difficult, but without the first steps being taken the 
journey will never begin. Conscious contracting seeks to understand what the parties want 
from the relationship in a mutually beneficial way. The parties will each have an agenda as to 
their ultimate goal and the parties, through openness and honest communication can help 
each other to realise these. Thus, conflicts will be resolved through bespoke and positive 
means, customised for each contract and to enable a positive resolution. The contracts will 
use plain language, designed for the users of the contract (as for the third-party applicants for 
example) to ensure clarity in what are the expectations and the consequences in the event of 
non-compliance. The parties contract as partners, with a view to an on-going and sustainable 
relationship (rather than the present system which is terminable with simply one-years’ 
notice) with only the required legal content included so as to result in a lean, focused 
document (removing many of the technical knock-out clauses as currently exist). Trust is 
core to the relationship and rather than rules governing behaviour, values and a transparency 
to terms and conditions underline the relational and collaborative mindset. 
 
For the MIB, there is an underlying rationale why the UtDA was drafted in a way to give the 
minimum protection to applicants, incorporating as they did knock-out and exclusion clauses, 
and seemingly draconian administrative provisions designed, it appeared, to make the 
submission of claims as difficult as possible or, at the least, giving the MIB an option to 
consider an application inadmissible for transgression of such rules. It is a private company, 
it represents an industry whose products are essential for anyone using a motor vehicle on 
public or private land, and it has to use funds sourced from the sales of these products to 
satisfy a guarantee fund where no tortfeasor may be sought to recover any payment made to a 
successful applicant. The EU requirements imposed on the UK, and which should have been 
transposed in these contracts under the remit of the other contracting party (the Secretary of 
State), were seen as an unfortunate barrier to it obtaining the best deal for itself. It is well 
known in the sector that the MIB drafted the UtDA (and its previous iterations) and the 
Secretary of State often simply accepted these rather than attempting to negotiate for the best 
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deal for the UK (possibly because the MIB did not consider itself as legally obliged to do 
more than the bare minimum in terms of protecting third-party victims and indeed, until 
2019, had considered it no more than a contracting party and not an ‘emanation of the state’ 
for the purposes of EU law).
73
 Consequently, the MIB’s contract would intend for it to win 
the best deal against the other parties (the Secretary of State and the applicants seeking 
compensation through the scheme). 
 
It might seem fanciful to expect the MIB and Secretary of State, unencumbered by the 
irritation of EU regulation, to suddenly begin to contract in a manner that has escaped them 
for so many years and would have stopped the numerous claims which found the UK to be in 
breach of its national and EU obligations. However, an interruption to these old habits and 
moving away from the conventional mindset is possible without sacrificing power or the 
safety that is typically found in standard commercial contracts. Just in the same way as 
climate change is requiring businesses to be mindful of their negative environmental impact, 
and modern slavery and sustainability
74
 are words and phrases that are entering the lexicon of 
consumers, individuals are expecting more of those businesses with which they contract and 
trade. Compulsory motor vehicle insurance is a legal requirement and there are only 24 
firms
75
 (establishing various subsidiary companies
76
 admittedly) with which an owner/driver 
may secure such a policy of insurance. Yet the movement towards CAVs, a movement likely 
to be exacerbated by the effects and implications on the environment from the physical 
movement restrictions following the COVID-19 outbreak,
77
 mean that the MIB and indeed 
the motor vehicle insurance industry could soon be at a crossroads – facing possible 
eradication and being replaced by a system of product liability. Therefore, and to remain 
viable and relevant in the sector, establishing a positive and protective resource which seeks 
to help and add value to road users and victims of negligent acts by the users of vehicles 
could prove to be instrumental in its continued feature in national motor vehicle insurance 
law and regulation. 
 
4.2. COULD CONSCIOUS CONTRACTING RECTIFY THE DEFECTS IN THE 
UtDA POST-2021? 
 
Instilling conscious contracting into new Agreements between the MIB and Secretary of 
State could be achieved using J. Kim Wright’s ‘Addressing Change and Engaging 
Disagreement’ model.78 It is important to begin, having acknowledged the problems included 
in the UtDA – both in respect of the EU obligations and procedural rules in relation to the 
CPR – that we must move forwards by considering both the MIB and the Secretary of State 
are contracting in good faith. The MIB maintains that it operates in compliance with its EU 
obligations
79
 and seems to have accepted, perhaps begrudgingly at first instance, the judicial 
decisions regarding its status and the correctness of the decisions of the CJEU. It is also 
worth remembering the origins of the MIB and the first MVID were based on the original 
agreement between the MIB and the (what is now) Secretary of State for Transport to rectify 
loopholes in the statutory provisions for vulnerable person protection. On this basis, a new 
Agreement should be a living document, ready to be changed and to be amended based on 
new circumstances and the needs of those people the Agreement seeks to protect – namely 
third-party victims of untraced drivers / vehicles. The UK’s future relationship with the EU or 
indeed other trading blocks will not be settled for many years and express recognition of this 
and provision for future trading block agreements to be incorporated quickly (or slowly), as 
necessary, would provide a significant advantage. 
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The underlying system of dispute resolution should be changed. The Agreement should not 
be based on a system of compulsory arbitration and appeals to the court as, has been shown, 
this creates a system fraught with problems and is the cause of much stress and 
inconvenience for individuals who are, by their nature, the victims of some form of physical 
injury and/or loss and are seeking to recover compensation to limit the negative effects of 
their situations. By mediating between the third-party claimant and the MIB, by instilling 
transparent policies which explain to the claimant how losses will be quantified, by enabling 
each claimant to legal advice, not simply limiting this to children or those identified as 
vulnerable under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 as is currently the case, and by following, as 
a minimum the same rules and processes as provided in the CPR, not only will the law be 
changed for the positive, but also a trained mediator can ensure that law is applied 
therapeutically (following Wexler’s bottle and wine metaphor).80 The adoption of the use of a 
neutral facilitator will prevent the perceived problems with impartiality, the mediator does 
not represent the interests of either party, nor do they give legal advice. Where mediation 
fails, a system of collaborative law where two specially trained lawyers, engaged to provide 
legal advice but also using problem-solving skills and facilitative techniques, could help the 
applicant and the MIB reach an amicable agreement. This system provides the legal expertise 
possibly needed for the resolution of some aspects of the Agreement, but also avoids the 
expense and time-consuming matter of the parties going to court to (finally) resolve the 
issues of concern. 
 
The Agreement, whilst between the MIB and the Secretary of State, is ultimately for the 
protection of third-party victims. Therefore, by establishing the contract using plain English, 
it makes the provisions, requirements and remedies awarded easier for applicants to 
understand, it removes possible misunderstandings by applicants, and it enables the parties 
and lawyers to proceed with certainty, removing perceived unfairness and doubt. An express 
commitment to operating in good faith and to do so according to mutually agreed values and 
vision can instil a compassion to the relationship which has been hitherto absent (despite 
what is currently expressed on the MIB’s website relating to its values).81 Whilst the 
Agreement is bound by national laws and must align with legal norms, a commitment to 
litigation as a last resort, reserved for the most extreme cases, and subject to mediation and/or 
collaborative law as the primary sources of dispute resolution would send a message to all 
involved in the application process of the sincerity of the parties and their intentions to be a 
genuine insurer of last resort. The safety net that offers the care and protection needed by the 
most vulnerable. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
Under the UtDA 2017 claimants are confronted by many misleading and confusing notice 
requirements and unlawful exclusions. This has been exacerbated by the duality of national 
and EU regulatory requirements. It is difficult to reconcile how the UK has maintained its 
position of allowing the application of this extra-statutory provision when considered in light 
of both the MVID and the growing and extensive jurisprudence of the CJEU. It is particularly 
concerning that both the UDA and the UtDA are drafted by the MIB and then agreed to, 
without revision, by the Secretary of State. This state of affairs is likely to continue given the 
recent general election (December 2019) and the Conservative government which has 
presided over the MVID for the past 10 years. It is unlikely to be remedied through 
legislative or administrative action, and the courts appear sometimes to be willing to provide 
an EU-consistent interpretation of national provisions and at other times refuse to be swayed 




 What is required is an entirely new Agreement, underpinned by a TJ philosophy, 
which adopts the care and understanding of judges such as Jay J,
83
 and seeks to engage the 
MIB and Secretary of State as partners who are working together for the betterment of those 
caught up in the aftermath of a road traffic accident against a tortfeasor who is uninsured or 
who is unidentified. In the looming realisation of the Brexit project, now is the most 
opportune time for a recalibration of the aims and values of the MIB, and for it to become the 
compensatory body that was envisioned in 1946. 
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